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Group versus Individual Liability:
A Field Experiment in the Philippines
Xavier Giné and Dean Karlan
ABSTRACT
Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit
movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds
of institutions around the world.  Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower
transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor and
enforce each other’s loans.  However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and
discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability.  Therefore,
it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender’s overall profitability and the poor’s
access to financial markets.  We worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment
to examine these issues.  We randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability “centers”
of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half
as-is with group liability (control).  We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect
the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients.
JEL Codes: C93, D71, D82, D91, G21, O12, O16, O17





Microfinance is seen by many as a promising and cost-effective tool in the fight against 
global poverty (Morduch 1999; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005; Microcredit Summit 
Campaign 2005).  Group liability, a contract feature found in many programs, is a common 
component in many microfinance programs.  Many believe that this feature, because of its 
purported ability to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems, is a key innovation 
responsible for the rapid growth of the microcredit movement in credit markets for the poor.  Its 
popularity can be linked to numerous perceived advantages.  By making a group of clients liable 
for each other’s loans, the lender can exploit local information to improve the screening, 
monitoring and enforcement.  Under group liability, clients have an incentive to screen other clients 
so that only trustworthy individuals are allowed into the program.  In addition, clients will make 
sure that funds are invested in profitable enterprises. Finally, enforcement is enhanced because 
clients face peer pressure, not just legal pressure, to repay their loans.  Thus, by effectively shifting 
the responsibility of certain tasks from the lender to the clients, group liability claims to overcome 
information asymmetries typically found in credit markets, especially for households without 
collateral. 
In recent years, however, some micro-lenders, such as the Association for Social 
Advancement (ASA) in Bangladesh or the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), have expanded rapidly 
using individual liability loans.  Others, like BancoSol in Bolivia, have converted a large share of 
its group lending portfolio into individual liability lending.  Even the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, the precursor of group liability lending, has recently relaxed the group liability clause 
in the Grameen II program by allowing defaulters to renegotiate their loans without invoking group 
pressure. 
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This shift from group liability to individual liability loans has accelerated as the 
microfinance community learns about some of the pitfalls of group liability lending programs.  
First, clients dislike the tension caused by group liability.  Excessive tension among members is not 
only responsible for voluntary dropouts but worse still, can also harm social capital among 
members, which is particularly important for the existence of safety nets.  Second, bad clients can 
“free ride” off of good clients causing default rates to rise.  In other words, a client does not repay 
the loan because she believes that another client will pay it for her, and the bank is near indifferent 
because it still gets its money back.  Third, group liability is more costly for clients that are good 
risks because they are often required to repay the loans of their peers.  This may lead to higher 
dropout and more difficulty in attracting new clients.  Finally, as groups mature, clients typically 
diverge in their demand for credit.  Heterogeneity in loan sizes can result in tension within the 
group as clients with smaller loans are reluctant to serve as a guarantor for those with larger loans. 
In sum, while repayment may improve under group liability, the client base may be smaller, so it 
remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender’s overall profitability and the poor’s 
access to financial markets.   
Despite being a question of first-order importance, empirical research on group versus 
individual liability lending has not provided policymakers and institutions the clean evidence 
needed to determine the relative merits of the two methodologies.1  The problem is that lenders 
typically chose the credit contract based on the context in which they operate.  Since in practice 
most microlenders use one type of loan, it is hard to identify impacts from a cross-section of loan 
                                                 
1 An empirical literature exists that examines within group lending programs, which group characteristics lead to higher 
repayment (e.g., higher social capital is the most common variable of interest), and this literature is often motivated by 
trying to test the same theories discussed here (Wydick 1999; Ahlin and Townsend 2005; Karlan 2005).  See Ahlin and 
Townsend (2006) for an empirical analysis of the selection decision into group or individual liability. 
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contracts if the different contexts have unobserved characteristics that influence its choice.  
Quoting Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), 
“The best evidence would come from well-designed, deliberate experiments in which 
loan contracts are varied but everything else is kept the same.” 
 
This is precisely the goal of the paper.  We use a randomized control trial conducted by the 
Green Bank of Caraga in the Philippines to evaluate the relative impact of group versus individual 
liability on client repayment and its overall profitability.  Half of Green Bank’s existing group-
lending centers in Leyte, an island in central Philippines, were randomly converted to individual 
liability in three waves between August 2004 and May 2005.  Using this conversion methodology, 
we are able to assess whether group liability overcomes information asymmetries and ultimately 
impact on access to credit. 
The separation of adverse selection from moral hazard is one of the most difficult empirical 
challenges when studying information asymmetries in credit markets.2  In this paper, we isolate the 
effects from moral hazard by “surprising” existing group liability member, already peer-screened 
under group liability.  We therefore address the question of whether the shift to individual liability 
exacerbates moral hazard by focusing on existing clients.  
Whereas the literature has focused almost exclusively on the superiority of group liability in 
ensuring repayment, we find no change in repayment for those centers converted to individual 
liability, and higher growth both due to fewer dropouts and more new clients.  In addition, we find 
that new entrants to the program had looser social ties to the prior members, suggesting that the 
screening imposed by group liability was limiting the growth of the existing programs.  We find 
direct evidence that individual liability leads to less monitoring of each other’s loan performance 
(although as noted, this lowered monitoring does not lead to higher default).  Lastly, we find that 
                                                 
2 See Karlan and Zinman (2006) for a similar separation of adverse selection from moral hazard in credit markets. 
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those with weaker social networks prior to the conversion are more likely to experience default 
problems after conversion to individual liability, relative to those who remain under group liability. 
In sum, as conversions from group to individual liability become more commonplace, we take the 
first step towards understanding whether and how such conversions work.    
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the literature on group 
versus individual liability lending programs.  Section III presents the experimental design and the 
administrative and survey data we collected.  Section IV presents the empirical strategy and 
primary results on the impact of group versus individual lending on center and individual 
performance.  Then, section V presents results from three surveys conducted one year after the 
initial conversion in order to learn more about the mechanism through which changes did or did not 
occur.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The theoretical literature has focused almost exclusively on comparing the repayment 
performance under group and individual liability. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) suggest that group 
liability can help institutions improve repayment through four channels: (i) ascertaining how risky 
the borrower is (adverse selection), (ii) ensuring that the funds will be used properly (ex-ante moral 
hazard), (iii) ensuring that the borrower tells the truth in case of default about her ability to pay 
(monitoring), (iv) enforcing repayment if the borrower is reluctant to pay (voluntary default, or ex-
post moral hazard).  Group liability contracts in theory can lead to higher repayment because 
borrowers have better information about each other’s types, can better monitor each other’s 
investment, and may be able to impose powerful non-pecuniary social sanctions at low cost. 
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However, there are other stories that suggest that group liability may instead jeopardize 
repayment.  For example, Besley and Coate (1995) point out that borrowers who would repay 
under individual liability may not do so under group liability.  This situation may arise if members 
realize that they cannot repay as a group.  In this situation, since (if rules are adhered to) no further 
loans will be granted, members that could otherwise repay decide to default because the incentive 
of future credit is not longer present.  This model also demonstrates that social collateral can help 
make joint liability work better than individual liability (baring the strategic default situation 
mentioned above).  However, Sadoulet (1997) argues that “social collateral” induced by group 
liability is not sufficient to ensure high repayment rates.  Finally, Rai and Sjostrom (2004) show 
that both individual and group liability alone can be dominated by a contract that elicits truthful 
revelation about the success of the peers’ project.  In their setup, high repayment is triggered by the 
ability of banks to impose non-pecuniary punishments to members according to their reports about 
their success and that of others.  More importantly, if borrowers have the ability to write contracts 
with one another (i.e., side-contract), group liability contracts can be excessively burdensome.  
This suggests that repayment is only one piece of the puzzle.  The lender’s ability to retain 
good borrowers and attract new ones is equally important to assess the overall profitability.  
Indeed, an institution with perfect repayment may be more profitable with lower repayment but a 
larger client base.  Madajewicz (2003) argues for instance that under group liability, loan sizes are 
limited by what the group can jointly guarantee, so clients with growing businesses or those who 
get well ahead of their peers in scale may find that the group contract bogs everyone down.  Below 
a certain scale, group liability dominates individual liability.  But above a certain size of business, 
individual lending will be preferred by customers.  One implication is that better-off clients tend to 
 7
seek individual loans as they move forward and indeed, many institutions that offer group liability 
loans are now offering new individual-liability contracts for successful clients. 
In the end, the relative contribution of group liability can only be determined empirically. 
Morduch (1999) and Armendariz and Morduch (2005) point out in their microfinance reviews that 
the performance of group liability contracts in developing countries has been very diverse.3  Thus 
far, however, since most claims are supported with anecdotes, we still lack good evidence on the 
relative importance of group liability vis a vis the other mechanisms, such as dynamic incentives, 
regular public repayments, etc. found in “group lending” schemes.  Notice that throughout this 
paper we maintain an important distinction between “group liability” and “group lending.”  “Group 
liability” refers to the terms of the actual contract, whereby individuals are both borrowers and 
simultaneously guarantors of other clients’ loans.  “Group lending” merely means there is some 
group aspect to the process or program, perhaps only logistical, like the sharing of a common 
meeting time and place to make payments.  The heart of this paper is testing whether a shift from 
group liability to “merely logistical” group lending leads to higher or lower repayment rates, client 
retention and to changes in group cohesion. 
   
III. Experimental Design and Data Collected 
 
A. Experimental Design 
The Green Bank of Caraga, a rural bank operating in central Philippines, conducted a field 
experiment in which they removed the group liability component of their Grameen-style4 group 
                                                 
3 See also Adams and Ladman (1979) and Desai (1983).  On anecdotal evidence on the limits to joint liability, see 
Matin (1997), Woolcock (1999) Montgomery (1996) and Rahman (1999). 
4 This is a Grameen “style” program since the bank conducts some basic credit evaluation, and does not rely entirely on 
peer selection.  The bank’s evaluation steps include essentially two components: physically visiting the business or 
home to verify the presence of the enterprise and its size, and an assessment of the repayment capacity of borrowers 
based on the client-reported cash-flows of their enterprise. 
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liability program, called BULAK5.  Typically a center starts with 15-30 individuals residing in the 
same barangay (community).  Centers grow in size as demand increases, without predetermined 
maximum sizes.  Within each center, members divide into groups of five.  Under the normal group 
liability system, those in the group of five are the first layer of liability for any default.  Only if 
those five fail to pay the arrearage of an individual is the center as a whole responsible for an 
individual.6  New members joining an existing center are also assigned into groups after mutual 
agreement is reached.  If at one point in time there are enough new members to form a new group 
of five, they may do so.  Across the central Philippines, Green Bank has over 12,000 clients in over 
400 BULAK centers in 27 branches.  This study was conducted on the island of Leyte, and all 169 
centers on the island were included in the sample frame. 
All loans under the BULAK program are given to microentrepreneurial women for their 
business expansion.  The initial loan is between 1,000 - 5,000 pesos (roughly $18 - $90).7  The 
maximum loan size increases by 5,000 pesos after every loan cycle, such that the maximum loan 
size in the 5th cycle is 25,000 pesos.  However, the loan size depends on repayment of their last 
loan, attendance at meetings, business growth, and contribution to their personal savings.  The 
interest rate is 2.5 percent per month, calculated over the original balance of the loan.  The client 
has between 8-25 weeks to repay the loan, but payments must be made on a weekly basis during 
the center meeting. 
As part of the BULAK program, clients are also required to make mandatory savings 
deposits at each meeting.  At loan disbursal, each member deposits 100 pesos plus two percent of 
                                                 
5 Bulak means flower in Tagalog, but is also the acronym for Bangong Ug Lihok Alang sa Kalambuan, which means 
“Strive for Progress.” 
6 Although many institutions that have this two-tier structure on paper do not enforce it in practice, Green Bank does 
enforce it. The payment of all members in a group is collected by the credit officer from group officials at the meetings. 
In addition, group members sign as co-makers for the rest of group members, thereby becoming the first to be liable if 
another group member is in default.  
7 Based on exchange rate of 56 Philippine Pesos = 1 US Dollar. 
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the loan amount into savings.  In addition, each member must pay an additional ten percent of their 
weekly due amount (principal plus interest) into their individual savings account.  Member savings 
may be used to repay debts and also act as collateral, although in this last case there are no fixed 
rules.  Finally, 10 pesos ($0.18) per meeting are required for the group and center collective 
savings account.  The center savings cover mostly the construction of the center meeting building 
(a small house or hut in the village) and other center activities, or as a last resort to repay member 
loans if the center is being dissolved and default remains.8  The group savings is held as collateral 
to cover arrearage within each group. 
In the experiment, the Green Bank randomly converted existing centers with group liability 
loans to individual liability loans.  All other aspects of the program remain the same (including 
attendance at center meetings and weekly payment made in groups).  Hence, the only two features 
that changed are the group liability and the savings rules.  By removing the group liability, no 
member is held liable for another member’s default.  Thus, members are no longer forced to 
contribute towards the repayment of other members in default and they are no longer required to 
sign as co-maker of loans for other group members.  If Green Bank had enforced a stricter group 
liability rule, the change to individual liability would also have entailed the issuing of new loans 
when other clients were in default. In practice, however, loans were already being issued to clients 
in good standing even when other individuals were in default.  For the conversion, the group and 
center savings were dissolved and shifted into individual savings accounts.  The total required 
savings deposits remained the same.9  With the conversion of group and center savings into 
individual savings, there no longer were funds set aside to pay for center activities.  Thus, all center 
activities in treatment groups must be paid for out of individual accounts on a per-activity basis.   
                                                 
8 In our observation, this never occurred. 
9 The new Personal Savings quota will be the previous amount of Personal Savings (based on the loan amount), plus 
P20, the amount previously given for Center and Group savings.   
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Critical to the design is the fact that treatment centers were converted from existing centers, 
and not newly created.  By comparing the repayment behavior of existing clients in group-liability 
centers and converted centers, we are able to isolate the impact of peer pressure imposed through 
group liability.10  
Our sample includes 169 BULAK centers in Leyte, handled by 11 credit officers in 6 
branches.  Among these, 161 had been created before August 2004, when the experiment started. 
Green Bank’s main competitors are NGOs (such as TSKI) which mostly offer group-liability loans 
and cooperatives (such as OCCCI) which offer individual liability loans.  At the time of the first 
conversion, about 28 percent of the existing centers were located in barangays with no other 
competitor, 53 percent of the centers were in barangays with at least one NGO and 47 percent of 
the barangays with Green Bank presence had at least one individual liability lender.11   
In August 2004, we implemented the first wave of conversions in 11 randomly selected 
centers (1 center per field officer).  In November, we randomly selected 24 more centers to be 
converted to individual-liability.  In the sample frame for this randomization, we included 8 
additional centers formed after August 2004.  Finally in May of 2005, we randomly selected 45 
more centers from the 125 remaining.  As of January 2006, the date of the data with which we 
conduct the impact analysis, there are 78 converted centers and 86 original (group-liability) centers 
(2 converted and 4 original centers were dissolved in the past 12 months).  Conversions were done 
in three waves because of the operational concern.  Credit officers were initially unwilling to be 
responsible for more than one individual-liability center until successful repayment was observed.  
                                                 
10 We also analyzed the impact of selection by comparing the performance of clients who joined three months before 
conversion to those that joined three months after.  We found no significant differences in repayment, savings and loan 
size.  Because the sample size of new entrants is rather small, and because the analysis is less clean as it relies a before 
versus after comparison (not an experimental comparison), we do not report these results. 
 
11 We run separate regressions for barangays with individual liability lenders and barangays with group liability 
lenders. The results do not differ significantly from those of Table 5 using all barangays and thus are not reported.  
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In order to minimize the pressure on the credit officers, and to assess early results to ensure default 
did not rise substantially, the conversion was completed in three waves.12  We stratified the 
randomization by credit officer in order to ensure all credit officers had the same proportion of 
treatment (converted) and control centers.  Since there were only 11 credit officers, the 
stratification ensured both a fair implementation across credit officers, and also an assignment to 
treatment that is not correlated with credit officer characteristics.  In addition, we periodically 
checked with credit officers and conducted surprise visits to center meetings and clients’ homes to 
confirm that converted centers had individual liability and that control centers had group liability.  
B.  Data Collected 
We use data from five sources.  First and most importantly, we use the Green Bank’s full 
administrative data on repayment and savings, loan sizes and client retention rates for all 3,343 
clients who were active members of the 169 centers at the time of the first randomization in August 
2004, as well as the 8 new centers opened after August 2004.  Second, we use data from an 
activity-based costing exercise that credit officers conducted, where for a given week, they had to 
keep a log of how they allocated their time across the different tasks they typically perform (e.g., 
attending meetings, assessing new clients, enforcing repayments, etc).  Third, we use a baseline 
survey conducted in November 2004 regarding the social relationships in the treatment groups as 
well as control groups.  Fourth, we use data from a follow-up survey on social networks, conducted 
in January 2006.  Finally, we use a survey of clients conducted in November 2005 (over one year 
after the start of the experiment) designed to understand the observed differences between 
converted and control centers. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics and some orthogonality checks that show that the 
randomization yielded observably similar treatment and control groups.  As of August 2004, prior 
                                                 
12 Note that increased default is not necessarily bad for the bank, since the bank cares about profits not merely default. 
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to any center being converted, there are no detectable differences in the main outcome variables 
between treatment and control centers.13 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Primary Results 
 The experimental design described in Section III allows us to test several hypotheses that 
emerged above in the discussion of the relative merits of group versus individual liability.  The 
primary goal is to measure the change in key variables that affect bank profitability, such as 
repayment, savings deposits held at the Green Bank by borrowers, loan size, and client retention 
and success attracting new clients.  In the next section we examine further hypotheses about 
specific mechanisms such as selection, monitoring, enforcement, and changes in social networks.  
 Table 2 presents the primary results.  Our empirical strategy takes into account the fact that 
not all centers were converted at the same time and that fifty percent remain in a control group 
throughout the study.  The primary specifications are analyzed at the individual level, with standard 
errors clustered at the center level.  The sample frame includes only clients that were borrowers at 
the time of each wave of the randomization.  This allows us to focus analytically on the ex-post 
changes in behavior generated by group versus individual liability.  We present the results of the 
three waves as if each were its own separate experiment (albeit sharing similar control groups14).  
This is done as such in order to account cleanly for any timing effects.   
                                                 
13 The orthogonality check verifies that the null hypothesis that there are no significant differences between the 
aggregated treatment and control groups cannot be rejected.  When disaggregated, and examined wave by wave, the 
first wave of centers assigned to treatment are smaller than the other treatment centers and control centers.  The 
primary specification controls for center-level fixed effects, so as long as this difference is not indicative of a difference 
in trends rather than levels, this imbalance is resolved in the fixed effect estimation model. 
14 They only differ if membership in the center changes between waves, if for instance individuals leave or join after 
one wave and before another.   
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 Specifically, we estimate a difference-in-difference model using OLS: 
yigt = α + βTgt + δt + θg +  εigt, 
where the subscript i refers to the individual, g the group, and t the time period, T is an indicator 
variable if center g is under an individual liability regime at time t, δt are time fixed effects and θg 
are center fixed effects.  Thus, β is the coefficient of interest. 
 Table 2 Columns 1, 2 and 3 show that the conversion to individual liability had no adverse 
(or advantageous) effect on client repayment.  Not only is the point estimate close to zero, but most 
economically significant effects can be ruled out:  the 95 percent confidence bound on default at 
the time of maturity (Column 2) is +/- 1.5% and 30 days after maturity (Column 3) is +/- 0.6%.  
Thus, we do not find strong enough evidence to support the “social collateral” story of Besley and 
Coate (1995) that predicts higher repayment for group liability loans on average15 (however, as 
noted elsewhere, the “conversion” to individual liability does not remove all “social collateral” 
since repayment is still public, and someone may repay in order to protect their reputation in the 
community).  Table 2 Column 4 shows that the savings behavior does not change after the 
conversion.  One may have expected higher savings in individual liability since the savings 
deposits were not held as collateral for other people’s loans, the expected return on savings is 
higher under individual liability (assuming there is some default in expectation under group 
liability). 
 Of course, the conversion to individual liability does imply both a reduction in peer 
pressure and an increase in bank pressure to repay.  The empirical analysis addressed above 
concludes that the net effect is nil.  To confirm that in fact the conversion was adhered to and group 
liability was not imposed in the treatment centers, we ask current members the reason why others 
                                                 
15 Below, we will examine heterogeneous treatment effects where we will find evidence for social collateral mattering 
for those with stronger levels of social networks.  On average, however, the net effect is that repayment is not higher 
under individual rather than group liability. 
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dropped out.  Appendix Table 1 shows these results.  Under individual liability, individuals are less 
likely to be forced out of the center in net (column 1), but importantly Column 2 shows that 
individuals are less likely to forced out by their peers and more likely to be forced out by the credit 
officer. 
We observe a (weak) reduction in loan size (Table 2, Column 6).  This result is significant 
statistically only for the second wave of the experiment, although the point estimates for the other 
waves are similar in magnitude.  The decrease is significant economically: a 958 peso reduction is 
15.7% of the average loan size of 6,082.  The bank reported to us that this drop is due to mainly 
two reasons.  First, individuals were withdrawing their individual savings (since they are no longer 
held in “communal” savings accounts as joint collateral) rather than borrowing in order to obtain 
the needed cash for their enterprise.  Second, credit officers were stricter on loan sizes under the 
individual liability in order to protect the repayment performance of their centers. 16 
Table 3 shows the results for Table 2, but pooled in one regression.  The results mimic 
those of Table 2, showing no effect on default and savings, and lower loan sizes.  Note that these 
specifications include new entrants to the program and separate estimates of their treatment effects.  
We find that the lower loan sizes are driven by the pre-existing borrowers, implying that credit 
officers were being more careful with larger borrowers.  
Table 4 uses a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the likelihood of dropout in each 
given time period.  We find a statistically insignificant effect for the sample as a whole.  However, 
when we examine heterogeneous treatment effects we find that those with a prior history of 
missing payments and those with larger loan sizes are less likely to drop out.  This implies that 
                                                 
16 Unfortunately, data are not available on savings withdrawals in order to test the first hypothesis empirically. In 
support of the second reason, credit officers confirmed in interviews conducted in January 2006 that they were being 
more careful when determining loan sizes of clients in converted centers.. 
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while on average individual liability lowers drop out, it does so change the composition of the 
clients in the program.  We will examine the net effect on profitability below. 
 Table 5 examines the main outcomes at the center level.  We estimate the following 
specifications using OLS: 
(1) ygt = α + βTgt + δt + θg +  εgt, 
where ygt is either the proportion of missed weeks, center size, retention rate,17 new accounts, 
number of dropouts or center dissolution for center g at time t, δt  is an indicator variable equal to 
one for time period t (time fixed effect), θg is a center fixed effect, and Tgt is an indicator variable 
equal to one if group g at time t had been converted to individual liability.  The time period is three 
months.  The coefficient of interest is β.  We test whether the liability rule matters by examining 
whether the coefficient β is significantly different from zero.  Notice that we use information from 
all clients who belonged at some point to the center between August 2004 and January 2005... 
We find that individual liability is much better at attracting new clients (Column 4), leading 
to larger centers (Column 2) and that individual liability makes existing centers 10% points less 
likely to be dissolved (Column 6).   
V. Additional Results on Specific Mechanisms 
We now turn to three sets of auxiliary data.  First, we examine the results of two activity-
based costing exercises completed by the credit officers in order to measure the change in their 
allocation of their time across centers.  Second, we examine the results of a client follow-up survey 
conducted in November 2005 (over one year after the initial conversion) on clients in both the 
treatment and control groups.  This survey includes several questions intended to tell us more about 
three possible mechanisms that could be influenced by the liability structure: center activities, 
selection and the flow of information (monitoring).  The survey was conducted during center 
                                                 
17 The retention rate between t and t+1 is defined as the percentage of clients at t that are still clients at t+1.  
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meetings and was administered to a sample of active members, including individuals who were 
members at the time of the conversion as well as new clients who entered afterwards.18  Third, we 
use social network data collected before the intervention and again one year later to examine the 
impact on social networks, as well as heterogeneous treatment effects for groups with different 
preexisting levels of social networks. 
A.  Lender Costs: Activity-Based Costing Exercise 
It is important from a sustainability perspective to examine the complete impact on the 
lender of such a change from group to individual liability.  If the lender spends more money on 
credit officer labor in order to screen, monitor and enforce loans then this is a necessary component 
of the analysis.  In order to evaluate to what extent this was true, we conducted two activity-based 
costing exercises in which each credit officer kept a detailed diary of all activities for one week.  
We then attributed their activities to either repayment (preparing for center meetings plus collection 
and processing of repayments outside of the meetings), center meeting, monitoring, enforcement 
and/or re-loan activities.  Table 6 reports these results.  We find no statistically significant 
differences in the way credit officers allocated their time, and furthermore the point estimates are 
actually the opposite of what one may have expected on enforcement.  On approval and processing 
of new loans (Column 7), credit officers do spend more time under individual liability, although 
again this result is not statistically significant. 
B.  Center Activities 
The client follow-up survey asked questions about center penalties for missing meetings, leaving 
early and missing payments as well as various activities such as anniversary, Christmas and snacks 
during the meeting.  Table 7 reports changes in penalties (columns 1 and 2) and activities between 
                                                 
18 Since meeting attendance is compulsory, we should not be concerned with having a bias sample of survey 
respondents.  In any event, we compared past repayment between respondents and non-respondents in converted and 
control centers and found no statistical differences across samples (largest t-stat is 0.82).  
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treatment and control centers.  We find that treatment centers impose lower penalties, possibly 
because meetings run smoother now that there is less need to enforce peer pressure among clients. 
However, the conversion to group liability may have resulted in lower center cohesion as 
evidenced by the lower probability of social events (not significant) and the lower amount spent 
(significant for Christmas parties). 
C.  Selection and Monitoring 
Four sets of analysis provide insight into the changes in the selection of clients and 
monitoring resulting from the change in liability.  We asked each member how well they knew the 
new members that had joined the center since intervention began.  Table 8 Columns 1 and 2 show 
these results.  We find that the prior members are more likely to know new members well under 
individual liability than under group liability.  This is striking, given the typical assumption that 
group lending programs encourage peers to screen each other.  However, this is consistent with 
evidence that the depth of family relations within a group is correlated with default (Ahlin and 
Townsend 2005).  Under individual liability, peers no longer fear the acrimony of having to punish 
someone close to them if there is default, and hence are more willing to invite in their closest 
friends and family.  New members, on the other hand, are less likely to know the other new 
members.  Since new members are typically not the ones who bring in new members, this indicates 
that groups are making fewer group decisions on whom to admit and instead individuals are 
inviting their close friends or family.  Thus prior members are closer to the new members, and new 
members are more distant to the other new members. This is also consistent with the fact that new 
members in treatment centers are less concerned with screening and learning about other new 
clients.  
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Second, we examine how well individuals know the “type” of the other members in the 
group.  We report these results in Table 8 Columns 3-12.  We asked each individual four questions: 
(1) What is the business of person X? (Columns 3 and 4), (2) How many weekly installments did 
person X miss over the past three months? (Columns 5 through 8), (3) Did person X miss any 
payments over the past three months? (Columns 9 and 10), and (4) Do you think person X will 
miss some payments over the next three months? (Columns 11 and 12).  We do not find any change 
in ability to report the peers’ businesses, but we do find lower levels of ability to report who has 
missed payments (hence evidence of reduced monitoring) and lower levels of ability to predict who 
will or will not default.  Again, this is evidence of lower monitoring, since it implies individuals are 
less informed about the status of each other’s business and lives and, hence, their ability to repay 
their loans.   
The third result on selection looks at the distribution of ability to pay (rather than observed 
repayment) among existing clients and new clients in treatment and control centers.  We asked how 
many times in the last 3 months they had difficulty in repaying the loan, regardless of whether or 
not they ended up completely repaying the loan installment.  We believe that this measure (rather 
than observed default) captures the combination of “type” (selection) and ex-ante moral hazard 
(effort) that is generated from group versus individual liability because being in default is only 
observed when the member does not have enough cash and other members fail to contribute toward 
the installment.  Since side contributions are compulsory in control centers but only voluntary in 
treatment centers, differences in default rate would come from not only different ability to repay 
but also different contribution levels from fellow group members.   
In theory, there are two groups of borrowers that would join only individual liability 
centers.  On one end of the distribution, bad risks would be screened out and rejected from group 
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liability centers but could be accepted in individual liability centers if the bank is unable to screen 
as effectively.  On the other end of the distribution, good risks may have little to gain and much to 
lose from the implicit risk-sharing agreement imposed by group liability.  They decide not to join 
group liability centers because they fear being forced to help other members repay more frequently 
than they will receive help.  The left panel of Figure 1 plots the distribution of the number of times 
new clients had difficulty making their payments, while the right panel plots the same distributions 
for baseline clients (those borrowing at the time of conversion, hence screened under group 
liability).  Interestingly, the distributions of baseline clients in treatment and control centers look 
alike, but the distribution of new clients in treatment centers is more concentrated around zero than 
that for control centers.  This suggests that good risks were reluctant to join group liability centers 
but do so after these centers are converted to individual liability.  We do not find evidence of bad 
risks also joining individual liability centers.  A test of equal variances between the distribution and 
control centers is significant for new clients and not significant for baseline clients.   
The fourth and last result on selection focuses on the interaction between demand and the 
competitive setting. Did individuals increase or decrease their borrowing with other lenders after 
the Green Bank converted to individual liability?  The results are reported in Table 9, where it is 
clear that the answer depends entirely on whether the other lender is a group or an individual 
liability lender.  If we restrict the analysis to barangays in which the competition is engaged in 
group lending, then we find that Green Bank clients are more likely to borrow from them after their 
group is switched to individual liability.  This indicates perhaps that some individuals prefer group 
liability (perhaps for the risk-sharing component of group liability) and hence when the group 
liability is removed they remain with the Green Bank but also then seek a loan from a separate 
group liability program.  On the other hand, when the competition only offers individual liability, 
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we see a reduction in the likelihood that individuals seek a loan (although this result is only 
significant in the tobit specification on loan size, and has a p-value of 0.17 for the probit 
specification).  This indicates, again, that individuals prefer one or the other type of liability: when 
the Green Bank switches to individual liability, individuals who prefer it are more satisfied, and 
individuals who prefer group liability seek supplementary loans from other group lending 
programs.   
D.  Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
 The shift to individual liability may have worked better (or worse) in groups with different 
levels of preexisting social networks.  If social collateral keeps repayment high, then “releasing” 
the collateral by converting to individual liability may lead individuals with higher social capital to 
have lower repayment rates.  On the other hand, if individuals have higher social capital because of 
their stronger and more trustworthy characters, then the shift to individual liability should be less 
likely to influence their decision to repay (since they are a “trustworthy” type, perhaps irrespective 
of whether social collateral is at stake or not).  We test these hypotheses in Table 10 by interacting 
treatment with one of various social network measures.  We categorize the social network channels 
as either “knowledge” or “trust”. “Knowledge” includes: family, friend since childhood, buys 
products or services, or visits once a week for social purposes. “Trust” includes has given a loan to 
the other person outside of the Green Bank program, voluntarily helped them pay their Green Bank 
loan, or turns to this person for advice or help. 
 We then examine two repayment measures: proportion of missed weekly payments, and 
percentage of loan past due at the time of maturity.  Note from earlier that missing weekly 
payments could be a sign of being trusted, not of being delinquent, since trusted individuals are 
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given more latitude during the term of their loan, in the case of a bad week or shock.  Default at the 
end of the cycle, however, is unequivocally avoided. 
 We find that proportion of missed weeks is overall lower under individual liability (just as 
reported in Table 2), but is statistically significant for those with stronger social networks.  If those 
with stronger social networks are given more latitude under group liability because others are able 
to vouch for their intent to repay the following week, the shift to individual liability reduces the 
frequency of missing payments since this luxury is no longer available.  This is similar to Karlan 
(2005), which uses data from a group lending program in Peru and finds evidence that those with 
higher social capital are able to default on loans and remain in the lending circle, whereas those 
with lower social capital are typically forced out after default. 
 Eventual default, however, is lower under individual liability for those with stronger social 
networks.  This may be an indication that those identified as having stronger social networks are 
more trustworthy, hence the shift to individual liability has no adverse effect on their likelihood of 
repaying.  Those with weaker social networks, however, are in fact more likely to go into default 
on their loan under individual liability, relative to those who remain in group liability.  An 
alternative hypothesis is that those with stronger social networks must repay their loan in both 
setups in order to protect their social networks.  Those with weaker social networks have less to 
lose (less social collateral, in the model of Besley and Coate (1995)), and hence the shift to 
individual liability generates higher default. 
E.  Changes in Social Networks 
Next, we examine the results of the follow-up social network survey.  In Table 11 we show 
these results.  As we have both baseline and follow-up data on social networks, we are able to 
employ a difference-in-difference empirical specification.  We find only one social network 
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channel to have changed: likelihood to help another person with a side-loan in order to help her 
make her loan payment.  Social networks should change under individual liability for many 
reasons.  First, with fewer incentives to monitor, they may find the quantity of interaction falls.  On 
the other hand, the quality of the interaction may increase since they no longer have to pressure 
each other to repay.  From selection, as found earlier, we find groups more connected because 
individuals are inviting closer friends and family to join the center.  However, in net, we find no 
significant impacts on social networks, barring the reduction in likelihood to make side-loans to 
each other.   
VI. Conclusion 
The choice of group or individual liability is perhaps one of the most basic questions 
lenders make in the design of loan products in credit markets for the poor.  Despite the importance 
of this decision, past empirical research on group and individual liability has not provided 
policymakers and institutions the clean evidence needed to determine the relative merits of the two 
methodologies.  In this study, we use a randomized control trial to evaluate the impact of group 
liability on the performance of clients and the profitability for the lending institution.  Naturally, 
these are the results over one year, from one lender in one region of the Philippines.  The results are 
striking, however, in two respects.  First, we find that individual liability compared to group 
liability leads to no change in repayment but is better at attracting new clients and keeping existing 
ones.  Second, we do find statistically significant evidence of some of the mechanisms discussed in 
the group liability literature, such as screening and monitoring, but we simply do not find that it 
adds up in an economically meaningful way to higher (or lower) default. 
 Our findings are consistent with the work of Greif (1994) in a rather different context.  He 
suggests that collectivist societies, like joint liability institutions in our setting, are based on the 
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ability to impose social sanctions to players that deviate from the agreed norms of conduct.  But 
this requires a level of trust and knowledge among players that may hinder expansion of the set of 
players thus leaving efficient trades unrealized.  A more individualistic society requires fewer 
exchanges of information among players and is thus able to grow faster.  It does necessitate, 
however, well-functioning formal institutions to enforce contracts.  In our context, shifting some of 
the burden from clients to credit officers strikes this balance successfully.  The institutional 
enforcement is sufficient to recover loans without group liability, and the individual liability allows 
for more growth and outreach for the lender.   
It is important to note that the primary experiment is on a sample of individuals who joined 
a group liability program.  This has the advantage of allowing us to isolate moral hazard effects, 
but has the disadvantage of restricting our ability to predict whether individual liability programs 
can work when the selection occurs under individual liability.  Furthermore, we cannot assess 
whether centers must achieve a certain age before the group liability can be successfully removed.  
Thus, while we contribute to understanding how such conversions work, it is also imperative to 
know whether centers can be sustainable if begun under individual liability. 
 In ongoing research with the Green Bank, we are working on an expansion of this program 
to new areas, and consequently will be testing whether the individual liability model will perform 
as well when groups are initially formed under individual liability.  We also are introducing a 
hybrid design in which centers start as group liability but are told that conditional on successful 
repayment, they will convert to individual liability in the future.   
In sum, the recent trend of microfinance institutions expanding their individual lending 
products (or in some cases, shifting from group liability to individual liability) should help deepen 
outreach and provide more flexible microfinance products for the poor.  Our findings suggest that 
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the innovators finding methods of lending individually (and more flexibly) to the poor are moving 
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Figure 1: Kernel Density: Number of weeks that clients had difficulty repaying
New Clients Baseline Clients
The left panel shows the kernel densities of the center average of the number of weeks in difficulty repaying over the three
months prior of the survey in November 2005 for treatment centers (red) and control centers (blue). The right panel plots the
same distribution for baseline clients. The sample includes clients who attended the center meeting when the survey was
conducted.
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Number of times clients had difficulty repaying, center average
All Waves Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Center Performance, pre-intervention
Total number of accounts 20.512 20.276 20.253 23.600 18.333 21.218 0.774
(0.925) (1.261) (1.367) (4.017) (2.653) (1.742)
Average Loan size 6078.750 6135.264 6009.355 4758.583 5997.003 6306.050 0.689
(159.833) (227.906) (223.152) (348.283) (413.538) (303.972)
Proportion of missed weeks over cycle 0.070 0.065 0.083 0.039 0.042 0.099 0.926
    (May-Aug 2004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.031)
Retention 0.904 0.901 0.906 0.933 0.930 0.892 0.758
    (May-Aug 2004) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 169 89 80 11 24 45
B. Individual-level Performance, pre-intervention
Proportion of missed weeks over cycle 0.062 0.058 0.066 0.090 0.065 0.059 0.241
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020) (0.008) (0.005)
Loan amount in August 2004 6082.074 6123.237 6036.125 5165.354 5778.497 6399.568 0.503
(64.944) (90.359) (93.072) (180.301) (193.300) (125.040)




Standard errors in parentheses. 52 pesos = US$1. t-statistics reported in column (7) is the probability of (column (2) - column (3)) being zero.
All






past due balance, 
at maturity date
Past due balance, 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Wave 1 Conversion (Aug 2004)
Treatment -0.017 0.051 0.004 9.679 -853.041
(0.040) (0.077) (0.003) (69.493) (726.291)
Constant 0.916*** 0.131*** 0.000 44.712*** 2,490.513***
(0.006) (0.021) (0.000) (16.487) (84.169)
Mean of dependent variable 0.078 0.133 0.001 272.561 6395.923
Observations 9027 9027 9027 8097 9027
Number of group(branch center) 97 97 97 97 97
R-squared 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.17
Panel B: Wave 2 Conversion (Nov 2004)
Treatment 0.017 0.070 0.002 -32.080 -962.557**
(0.014) (0.113) (0.003) (29.751) (418.074)
Constant 0.831*** 0.188*** 0.002*** 111.848*** 354.202*
(0.016) (0.042) (0.001) (12.333) (206.981)
Mean of dependent variable 0.075 0.179 0.002 271.560 6314.152
Observations 10557 10557 10557 9434 10557
Number of group(branch center) 112 112 112 112 112
R-squared 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14
Panel C: Wave 3 Conversion (May 2005)
Treatment -0.029 0.029 0.003 -407.574
(0.022) (0.091) (0.003) (343.917)
Constant 0.008 0.094* 0.002*** 2,724.253***
(0.007) (0.051) (0.000) (88.509)
Mean of dependent variable 0.076 0.131 0.001 6345.303
Observations 14189 14189 14189 14189
Number of group(branch center) 134 134 134 134
R-squared 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.12
Robust standard errors clustered by lending centers in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. All regressions use fixed effect for lending centers and time. Proportion of missed weeks is calculated by the number of
weeks in which the client did not make the full installment divided by the number of installments. Savings data are only analyzed
up to September 2005 because systematic savings policy changes for control centers occurred in September 2005 which effectively
required higher savings in control centers than treatment centers. Treatment variable is one if the loan cycle ends after the
conversion in treatment centers; zero otherwise.
Table 2: Cycle-level Impact on Default, Savings, and Loan Size by Conversion Waves





Percentage of past 
due balance, at 
maturity date
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment -0.009 -0.146 -0.001 -19.397 -620.800**
(0.016) (0.106) (0.002) (22.184) (264.535)
New member after Aug 04 -0.016 -0.067 -0.001 -23.194 -3,405.221***
(0.010) (0.095) (0.001) (21.267) (257.466)
New member after Nov 04 -0.008 -0.057 -0.001 23.726 -964.930***
(0.014) (0.202) (0.003) (28.997) (321.448)
New member after May 05 -0.049** 0.135 -0.001 -67.756 -1,542.772***
(0.019) (0.470) (0.009) (44.004) (381.606)
Treatment x New member after Aug 04 0.003 0.788 0.011 41.056 975.684***
(0.018) (0.527) (0.008) (37.712) (334.453)
Treatment x New member after Nov 04 -0.004 -0.792 -0.013 57.082 -775.486*
(0.023) (0.513) (0.008) (47.004) (422.484)
Treatment x New member after May 05 0.051 0.194 0.009 -4.612 518.325
(0.038) (0.624) (0.016) (71.083) (473.306)
Constant 0.624*** 0.124*** 0.001*** 167.416*** 1,176.215**
(0.218) (0.027) (0.001) (60.982) (476.488)
Mean of dependent variable 0.080 0.184 0.002 253.021 6154.993
Observations 18217 18217 18217 18122 18217
R-squared 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.18
Robust standard errors clustered by lending center in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All
regressions use fixed effect for centers and time. Proportion of missed weeks is calculated by the number of weeks in which the client did
not make the full installment divided by the number of installments. Savings data only analyzed up to September 2005 because systematic
savings policy changes for control centers occurred in September 2005 which effectively required higher savings in control centers than
treatment centers.  Treatment variable is one if the loan cycle ends after the conversion in treatment centers; zero otherwise.
Table 3: Cycle-level Impact on Default, Savings, and Loan Size, All waves combined
Sample frame: All clients (both baseline and new clients)
Sample Frame: All
Never missed 
payment,                pre-
intervention
Missed payment,    
pre-intervention
Loan size above 
median
Loan size below 
median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Wave 1
Treatment 0.841 0.811 0.881 0.760** 0.866
(0.120) (0.154) (0.125) (0.101) (0.150)
Observations 2230 767 1463 1011 1219
Panel B: Wave 2
Treatment 1.051 0.980 1.132 0.926 1.089
(0.158) (0.188) (0.206) (0.196) (0.185)
Observations 2585 972 1613 1188 1397
Panel C: Wave 3
Treatment 0.842 1.111 0.790* 0.769* 0.929
(0.100) (0.208) (0.107) (0.110) (0.150)
Observations 2821 875 1946 1487 1334
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model estimated is the Cox proportional hazard. Reported are
hazard ratios and standard errors in parentheses, calculated assuming within-center clustering. Lower hazard ratio (<1) indicates that
clients in Treatment centers stay longer in the program and that conversion into individual-liability is associated with lower likelihood of
dropping out.
Sample frame: Baseline clients only
Table 4: Impact on Dropout
Cox proportional hazard model, failure = dropout









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.006 1.826** 0.015 1.190** -0.119 -0.106*
(0.013) (0.762) (0.019) (0.486) (0.284) (0.059)
Constant 0.078*** 17.866*** 0.922*** 1.553*** 1.376*** 0.109
(0.014) (1.203) (0.012) (0.354) (0.179) (0.067)
Observations 1088 1498 1312 1294 1312 169
Number of centers 169 169 169 169 169
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.16
Table 5: Center-level Performance
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns (1)
through (5) use fixed effect for centers and time, and every center has an observation on each outcome for every three
month between August 2003 and November 2005. Column (6) uses fixed effect for credit officers. Number of






Time on center 
meeting
Time on loan 
monitoring





clients Time on reloan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment 0.019 0.029 -0.033 -0.085 -0.145 -0.086 0.211
(0.268) (0.157) (0.086) (0.066) (0.087) (0.071) (0.143)
Constant 1.640** 1.333** 0.487** 0.108 0.139 0.090 -0.020
(0.267) (0.164) (0.089) (0.074) (0.097) (0.070) (0.120)
Observations 146 146 146 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.32 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.15
Table 6: Activity-Based Costing Analysis: Time Spent on Different Activities by Center
Robust standard errors in paretheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Each cell reports the average time in hours
spent on indicated activity per center in a given week in January 2006. Repayment includes preparing for center meetings, travel time, and
handling the collection; center meeting indicates the time spent on the actual meeting. Monitoring involves making reports, answering clients'
questions; enforcement includes loan utilization check and following up with delinquent clients. Reloan includes conducting credit evaluation,















OLS OLS Probit Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (5) (7)
Treatment -10.095* -9.548* -0.004 -0.066 -582.518 -0.002 -695.057*
(5.583) (5.613) (0.059) (0.096) (871.233) (0.076) (396.256)
Constant 43.285*** 42.996*** 1,541.259 1,231.029**
(8.209) (8.254) (2,267.019) (524.747)
Observations 131 131 113 131 60 131 99
R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.14
Table 7: Center activities
Anniversary Christmas parties
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Penalties include not attending, leaving early from, 
being late to the meeting, and missing payments.






























probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment 0.310*** -0.272*** -0.000 0.018 -4.585 -1.970 -0.091* -0.259** -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.059**
(0.104) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (5.582) (6.363) (0.048) (0.100) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) (0.029)
Constant 0.524*** 0.323*** 101.385*** 81.935*** -0.933*** -0.787*** 0.716*** 0.285** 0.897*** 0.888***
(0.071) (0.086) (11.602) (12.856) (0.123) (0.184) (0.075) (0.128) (0.026) (0.031)
Observations 1693 971 4015 1908 2902 1376 4128 2178 4161 2194 3684 1926
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.29 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.09
Table 8: Knowledge About Other Members of the Center
Sample Frame: Clients who were present at the survey which took place during a center meeting in November 2005
Knew whether or not 
the client defaultedKnew Business
Negative value of 
difference between 
reported and actual 
amount of installment
Negative value of 
difference between 
reported and actual 
number of defaults
Knew the new member 
well when they entered 
the center
Clients were asked about (a) how well they knew incoming members who joined the center, and 
(b) other members' performances over three months prior to the survey
Knowledge about all other members
Knowledge about new 
members only
Robust standard errors clustered by respondents in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal coefficients reported for the probit
specifications. All regressions use fixed effect for credit officers. Dependent variable for regressions in columns (1) and (2) is a categorical variable for how well the respondent
knew the new member before she joined the program; 0 if did not know at all, 1 if knew a little, 2 if knew well, 3 if knew very well.
Predicted default






Probit Probit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Tobit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 0.062* -0.021 5,039.823*** -455.887 -0.049 -0.028 -8,703.439* -5,972.977
(0.034) (0.051) (1,907.141) (1,650.910) (0.035) (0.029) (4,856.900) (4,435.156)
Constant 0.125 0.000 -16,047.552*** -41,404.006 0.377** 0.006 -34,524.886*** -74,270.657
(0.105) (0.000) (4,455.048) (677,400.165) (0.174) (0.008) (7,756.664) (1415746.981)
Observations 474 269 474 269 476 257 476 257
R-squared 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.10
Robust standard errors clustered by lending center in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects reported for the
probit specifications. All regressions have fixed effect for credit officers. Dependent variable for columns (1)-(2) are binary variable equal to one if the client currently
has loans from NGOs; that of columns (3)-(4) are binary variable equal to one if the client currently has loans from COOPs.
Table 9: Current Borrowing from Other Lenders
Sample Frame: Clients who were present at the survey which took place during a center meeting in November 2005
Has loan from competitorHas loan from competitor Loan size from competitorLoan size from competitor











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mean of social network out-degree measure 0.110 0.045 0.291 0.131 0.410 0.036 0.015 0.071 0.092 0.418
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Panel A: Dependent variable is proportion of missed weeks
Treatment -0.036 -0.033 0.003 -0.029 0.000 -0.028 -0.035 -0.041* -0.019 0.005
(0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
Social network out-degree -0.001 0.028 0.102*** 0.067** 0.077*** 0.128*** 0.103 0.008 0.108** 0.082***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.027) (0.049) (0.078) (0.038) (0.043) (0.027)
Treatment x Social network out-degree -0.023 -0.073 -0.114** -0.064 -0.080** -0.155* -0.162 0.046 -0.145** -0.087**
(0.047) (0.061) (0.055) (0.054) (0.040) (0.081) (0.127) (0.137) (0.060) (0.038)
Constant 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.038 0.072*** 0.044 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.066** 0.040
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Observations 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688
Number of center fixed effects 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Panel B: Dependent variable is percentage of past due balance at the maturity date
Treatment 0.419 0.194 0.488 0.493* 0.728 0.466* 0.279 0.038 0.509* 0.765
(0.285) (0.321) (0.431) (0.297) (0.562) (0.272) (0.262) (0.505) (0.283) (0.574)
Social network out-degree -0.550 -0.179 0.543 -0.043 0.046 0.160 0.342 -0.042 0.238 0.118
(0.395) (0.466) (0.357) (0.340) (0.220) (0.436) (0.906) (0.280) (0.370) (0.260)
Treatment x Social network out-degree -1.617 0.913 -0.642 -1.908 -1.006 -3.703 -1.359 3.256 -2.312** -1.050
(1.227) (1.768) (0.848) (1.678) (1.007) (2.412) (1.480) (5.341) (1.094) (0.987)
Constant 0.549*** 0.459*** 0.203 0.439*** 0.348*** 0.310** 0.432*** 0.538** 0.362*** 0.309**
(0.143) (0.127) (0.174) (0.125) (0.133) (0.134) (0.121) (0.207) (0.115) (0.148)
Observations 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688 2688
Number of center fixed effects 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Social network variables are defined as below:
1
2 Friends: Have known this person since either one was a child (non-family members/relative)
3 Bought products: Have bought products or services from this person
4 Visit once a week: Visit this person house for social purposes at least once a week. 
5 Knowledge index: Aggregate of 1 through 4
6 Given loan: Have given this person a loan outside of Bulak.
7 Voluntarily helped: Have voluntarily helped this person repay loans in Bulak. 
8 Go for advise: Turn to this person for advise or help for any type of life problem; health, financial, or emotional. 
9 Trust: Aggregate of 6 through 8
# All: Aggregate of 1through 4, and 6 through 8.
OLS
Table 10: Impact of Social Network on Default
Knowledge
Robust standard errors clustered by lending centers in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions use fixed effect for time and centers.
Panel A reports the regressions on indegree over maximum number of links possible. This measure reports how prestigious is the member in relation to the group size from a degree
perspective (the member has more prestige if he/she receives many links); Panel B reports the regressions on outdegree over maximum number of links possible. This measure reports
how central is the member in relation to the group size f.rom a degree perspective (the member is more central if he/she sends manylinks). See below for the definition of social network
indices
Family: Have known this person since either one was a child (grandparents, parents, siblings, spouses, children, grandchildren, and cousins).





Family Friends Buy products
Visit once a 
week Given loan
Voluntary 
help Go for advice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment -0.004 -0.001 -0.021 -0.003 -0.024 0.016 0.022 0.010 0.004 -0.020
(0.034) (0.010) (0.040) (0.030) (0.042) (0.019) (0.015) (0.029) (0.030) (0.040)
Post -0.013 0.054*** 0.000 0.102*** -0.046 0.051*** 0.003 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.057
(0.030) (0.009) (0.035) (0.027) (0.037) (0.017) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026) (0.035)
Treatment x Post -0.034 0.001 0.032 -0.039 0.024 -0.044* -0.018 -0.033 -0.029 0.022
(0.043) (0.013) (0.052) (0.039) (0.054) (0.025) (0.020) (0.038) (0.038) (0.051)
Constant 0.258*** 0.041** 0.328*** 0.058 0.512*** -0.001 0.012 0.033 0.052 0.442***
(0.056) (0.017) (0.067) (0.051) (0.070) (0.032) (0.026) (0.049) (0.050) (0.067)
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
R-squared 0.09 0.35 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.17 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.29
Social network variables are defined as below:
1
2 Friends: Have known this person since either one was a child (non-family members/relative)
3 Bought products: Have bought products or services from this person
4 Visit once a week: Visit this person house for social purposes at least once a week. 
5 Knowledge index: Aggregate of 1 through 4
6 Given loan: Have given this person a loan outside of Bulak.
7 Voluntarily helped: Have voluntarily helped this person repay loans in Bulak. 
8 Go for advise: Turn to this person for advise or help for any type of life problem; health, financial, or emotional. 
9 Trust: Aggregate of 6 through 8
10 All: Aggregate of 1 through 4, and 6 through 8.
Table 11: Impact on Center-level Social Network
OLS, Difference-in-Difference
Robust standard errors clustered by lending center is in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Social network density is calculated by the
number of links divided by the maximum number of possible links. Baseline social network data collected in November 2004. Follow-up data collected in January 2006. All
regressions use fixed effect for credit officers.










Dependent Variable: Forced Out
Treatment -0.091***
(0.012)
Dependent Variable: Forced Out by Center Members
Treatment -0.539***
(0.056)





Appendix Table 1: Reasons for Dropout
Robust standard errors clustered by respondents in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. Marginal coefficients reported for the probit specifications. The omitted variable for the
multinomial-logit model in column (2) is voluntary dropout. "Forced out" and "Forced out by center members"
include those clients who "voluntarily" dropped out because she was embarrassed for her bad performance.
Dependent variable in column 1 is a categorical variable which equals to one if any respondent reported that the
client was forced out by center members or by credit officers, and zero otherwise. Dependent variable in column
2 is a categorical variable which equals to one if any respondent reported that the client was forced out by center
members, equals to two if anyone reported that the client was forced out by credit officer, and zero otherwise.
Sample Frame Restricted to clients who dropped out from the program 
within three months of follow-up survey.
